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Brexit – potential economic 
consequences if the UK exits 
the EU 
If the United Kingdom (UK) exits the EU in 2018, it would 
reduce that country’s exports and make imports more ex-
pensive. Depending on the extent of trade policy isolation, 
the UK’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita would 
be between 0.6 and 3.0 percent lower in the year 2030 
than if the country remained in the EU. If we take into ac-
count the dynamic effects that economic integration has on 
investment and innovation behavior, the GDP losses could 
rise to 14 percent. In addition, it will bring unforeseeable po-
litical disadvantages for the EU – so from our perspective, 
we must avoid a Brexit.
Focus  
 
Depending on the extent of trade isolation 
resulting from a Brexit, the deadweight 
welfare losses would differ for the remain-
ing EU member states. For example, Ger-
many’s real GDP per capita would be be-
tween 0.1 and 0.3 percent lower in 2030 
than without a Brexit due to the decline in 
trade activities. These static deadweight 
welfare effects are compounded by dy-
namic effects that could cause a drop in 
the GDP in Germany by up to 2 percent. 
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Since the UK joined the European Com-
munity in 1973, its relationship to the rest 
of Europe and the European Union (EU) 
has been tense, ranging from critical to 
aloof. It already held a referendum in 1975 
on whether to remain in the European 
Community. In 1984, Prime Minister Mar-
garet Thatcher spoke the now legendary 
words, “I want my money back!” – and ob-
tained a rebate on British contributions to 
the EU budget that is honored to this day 
(see Freund/Schwarzer 2011). The UK still 
has not signed off on the Schengen Agree-
ment, which took effect 1995 and abol-
ished border checks between the participat-
ing EU countries. 
The UK is by no means the only country 
with voices critical of the EU. Parties in 
other member states such as “Die (wahren) 
Finnen,” the “Alternative für Deutsch-
land,” Italy’s “Lega Nord” and the “Partij 
voor de Vrijheid” headed by Dutch right-
wing populist Geert Wilders are EU-skep-
tic movements that are gaining traction (see 
Peters 2014, pg. 10 as well as Hoffmann 
2014, pp. 2-10). There are a variety of rea-
sons for rejecting the EU. The most im-
portant of these include the fear of losing 
national identity and sovereignty, concerns 
about overregulation by the EU through 
transferring too much power to Brussels, 
and high net payments to the Community. 
High immigration levels from other EU 
member states accompanied by the loss of 
the country’s own culture, rising unem-
ployment and the social security systems 
being overwhelmed are also fueling anxi-
ety in the population. In addition, people 
are questioning whether EU membership 
offers any benefits at all for their own 
country (see Beichelt 2010 and Peters 
2014). 
 
Harboring doubts about the advantages of 
a common Europe is not just unique to the 
British. However, the EU is facing the 
greatest skepticism in the UK. At the end 
of 2014, the market research network 
WIN/Gallup International conducted a rep-
resentative population survey in 11 EU 
countries. Among other things, it asked 
how the citizens would vote if a referen-
dum were held in 
their country on re-
maining in the EU. 
64 percent of those 
surveyed in the 11 
member countries 
supported staying in 
the EU. The desire to 
continue EU mem-
bership prevailed in 
10 countries. In Ger-
many, approval was at 73 percent. In the 
UK, a scant majority of 51 percent sup-
ported exiting the EU (see Euractiv.de 
2015). 
 
In light of this fundamentally critical atti-
tude, it is not surprising that the UK has yet 
again been discussing an EU referendum 
for some time. British Prime Minister Da-
vid Cameron announced in January 2013 
that he would allow such a referendum if 
he is reelected (see The Conservative Party 
Manifesto 2015, pg. 72). The Labour Party 
as well as the Liberal Democrats reject this 
referendum. 
 
 
 
 
»Brexit«, the term coined by the media from the words “Brit-
ain” and “exit”, is misleading in that Britain would not be exit-
ing the EU, but rather the United Kingdom, which includes 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The geograph-
ical term “British Isles” also encompasses Ireland, which is not 
debating whether to leave the EU. The terms “UK” and “Brit-
ish” are used synonymously in this text. For example, when we 
talk about the British GDP, we mean the GDP of the United 
Kingdom (UK). 
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1. Economic effects of a 
Brexit on the UK 
The question of whether a British exit from 
the EU would increase or decrease the 
country’s economic growth and its real in-
come as measured by the gross domestic 
product is controversial. There is a whole 
series of studies that examine the economic 
advantages and disadvantages of EU mem-
bership – and yield a variety of different re-
sults. A study by the Open Europe Think 
Tank, a group critical of Brussels, reaches 
the following conclusion: If the UK exits 
the EU on January 1, 2018, the GDP in 
2030 would be 2.2 percent lower than if it 
remained in the EU (in its least favorable 
scenario). In the most favorable case, a 
higher GDP of around 1.6 percent is possi-
ble. The politically realistic range of 
growth effects from exiting the EU would 
come in between 0.6 percent higher and 0.8 
percent lower GDP (see Persson et al 2015, 
pg. 2). The Center for Financial Studies 
calculates a loss of prosperity for the UK 
even under optimistic assumptions. Ac-
cording to it, the real GDP losses – taking 
into account the savings from payments not 
made to the EU budget – would lie between 
1.1 and 3.1 percent. If dynamic effects are 
also taken into consideration, meaning low 
productivity growth resulting from exiting 
the EU, income drops of 6.3 to 9.5 percent 
are conceivable (see Ottaviano et al 2014, 
pp. 8-11). 
 
The problem lies in the fact that the results 
of simulation calculations depend substan-
tially on the underlying assumptions of 
how the UK would organize its relations 
with the remaining EU states and other 
trade partners after a Brexit. Exiting the EU 
can have far-reaching consequences: The 
four basic freedoms of the European do-
mestic market (free movement of goods, 
services, capital and people) with the other 
EU members would no longer apply. The 
EU’s trade agreements – currently 38 ac-
tive agreements and 12 agreements still in 
negotiation – would be invalid. Many areas 
of government, some of which fall under 
the EU’s jurisdiction, would need to be ad-
justed or re-established. For those reasons, 
there is a great deal of uncertainty regard-
ing the specific consequences under inter-
national law of a country exiting the EU. 
Therefore, quantifying the economic ef-
fects of this exit can only be approximate 
and heavily driven by assumptions. To il-
lustrate these uncertainties, we present the 
following three scenarios in which the ifo 
Institute has calculated the effects on GDP 
using a variety of empirical simulation 
techniques. Unlike the above-mentioned 
studies, it determines not only effects on 
the UK, but the consequences for the rest 
of the world and Germany as well. In all 
three scenarios, the UK loses its trade priv-
ileges with the EU: 
 
1. In the most favorable case from the 
British perspective (“soft exit”), the UK 
receives a status similar to that of Swit-
zerland or Norway and thereby has a 
trade agreement with the EU. While 
there would be non-tariff barriers to 
trade, there would be no tariffs. 
 
2.  In the second most favorable scenario 
(“deep cut”), this trade agreement does 
not exist. As a result, there are higher 
non-tariff barriers to trade as well as to 
tariffs in trade between the UK and EU. 
These tariffs reach the level found in 
foreign trade relations between the EU 
and USA. 
 
3. In the least favorable scenario (“isola-
tion of the UK”), the country also loses 
all privileges arising from the EU’s 38 
existing trade agreements with other 
countries. Although the UK can reach 
new trade agreements through inde-
pendent negotiations, experience has 
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shown that this is a lengthy process. 
Moreover, the UK’s negotiating power 
would be less than that of the EU. 
 
All of these scenarios show an increase in 
the cost of British exports as well as for im-
ported consumer goods and advance pay-
ments. Declining exports and rising prices 
result in a downturn in economic activities 
and a lower real GDP. 
 
Aside from the economic disadvantages of 
exiting the EU, we must also take into ac-
count the canceled annual payments to the 
EU budget. In 2013, the net contribution 
that the UK paid to the EU was approxi-
mately €8.64 billion, or around 0.5 percent 
of British economic strength as measured 
by the GDP. Savings from canceling these 
payments represent the UK’s greatest eco-
nomic benefit from a Brexit. 
 
2. EU exit would damage 
British economic growth 
 
The UK is closely intertwined economi-
cally with the EU. Currently, more than 50 
percent of British exports go to EU mem-
ber states. Over 50 percent of the country’s 
imports also come from the EU. In the mid-
1960s, these were both significantly less 
than 40%. 
Exiting the EU would increase the costs of 
trade between the UK and EU and reduce 
bilateral trade activities. The specific ex-
tent of associated changes in real income is 
shown for the selected countries in the fo-
cus graphic (pg. 1). Depending on the de-
gree of assumed trade isolation, real in-
come losses for the British economy range 
between 0.6 and 3 percent. The severity of 
the impact will differ for individual indus-
tries. In particular, the chemicals, mechan-
ical engineering and automotive industries 
will see steep losses in value added because 
they are heavily incorporated in European 
value chains. The chemicals industry will 
face the greatest drop – nearly 11 percent. 
For the more important area of financial 
services, anticipated losses in value added 
reach around 5 percent in the unfavorable 
scenario. 
 
The losses in income shown above result 
exclusively from lower trade levels due to 
a Brexit. However, the dynamic effects 
must also be taken into account in addition 
to these static effects. The following two 
aspects are among the most important: 
 
1. Declining cross-border trade activities 
also have a negative impact on a coun-
try’s productivity growth: If the pres-
sure from international competition 
weakens, domestic companies have less 
need to improve their competitiveness 
through invest-
ments and innova-
tion. Therefore, 
productivity 
growth falls. Ac-
cording to studies 
that estimate the 
influence of de-
creasing trade 
openness on the 
long-term real 
GDP (Freyer 2009 and Felber-
mayr/Gröschl 2013), a Brexit could 
lead to a long-term drop in the UK’s 
real GDP per capita ranging from 2 per-
cent (“soft exit”) to 14 percent (“isola-
tion of the UK”) compared to remaining 
in the EU. 
The terms “loss of income” or “GDP losses” describe the differ-
ence expressed in percentages between the observed real GDP in 
the base year (2014) and the simulated (counterfactual) value for 
a situation in which the UK is not an EU member. Based on expe-
rience, trade policy measures take 10 to 12 years after they are 
introduced to reach full effect. If a Brexit occurs in 2018, the high-
lighted effects would be fully felt by 2030. No prognosis is made 
for global GDP numbers with and without a Brexit for the year 
2030 due to the associated additional uncertainties. 
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2. The EU is currently in negotiation with 
a number of countries on bilateral free 
trade agreements that are close to ratifi-
cation (Canada, USA, Japan, Singa-
pore, India, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.). 
The EU is expecting positive growth 
momentum from the accompanying 
heavier trade integration. By exiting the 
EU, the UK would forgo this impetus 
for growth. The long-term GDP losses 
associated with this would range from 
1.4 percent in case of a soft exit to 7.5 
percent with a deep cut scenario. 
 
3. The Brexit’s economic 
effects on Germany and 
Europe 
If the UK’s economic growth slows down 
due to exiting the EU, this also has eco-
nomic consequences for its trade partners. 
A lower real income leads to declining de-
mand for goods and services – and also for 
imports. For trade partners, this means 
lower exports and therefore lower produc-
tion as well. Nevertheless, the GDP losses 
for the rest of the world are relatively mod-
erate compared to the economic disad-
vantages for the UK. For example, the ef-
fects of decreasing trade activities in Ger-
many (static effects, see focus graphic, pg. 
1) would be relatively minor with a real 
GDP per capita drop of 0.1 to 0.3 percent 
in the year 2030. Individual industries 
would be impacted differently by lower ex-
ports to the UK. The automotive industry 
would see the greatest drop in value added 
by sector with a decline of up to 2 percent. 
 
For the entire remaining EU-27 (without 
the UK), the expected reduction in real 
GDP per capita due to lower trade activity 
with the UK would fall between 0.1 percent 
with a soft Brexit and around 0.4 percent in 
case of UK isolation, although significant 
regional differences would emerge (see fo-
cus graphic, pg. 1). Ireland would be hit 
particularly hard with real income losses of 
between 0.8 and 2.7 percent. Other coun-
tries that would see above average GDP 
drops include Luxembourg, Belgium and 
Sweden as well as Malta and Cyprus, 
which are not shown in the focus graphic. 
Germany’s static deadweight welfare 
losses described above would lie slightly 
below the EU-27 average. 
 
If the dynamic effects of a Brexit are taken 
into account, the impact is greater: De-
pending on the Brexit scenario and under-
lying econometric estimates, the long-term 
real GDP per capita in Germany would 
range between 0.3 and 2 percent below the 
value projected if the UK were to remain in 
the EU. 
 
In addition, we must also take into consid-
eration that the remaining EU member 
states would need to compensate for the 
lost British contributions to the EU budget 
in case of a Brexit. For Germany that 
would add approximately €2.5 billion 
(gross) to its annual expenditures. France 
would have to pay an additional €1.9 bil-
lion, Italy almost €1.4 billion and Spain 
around €0.9 billion (see Fig. 1). 
 
4. Assessment and outlook 
The assessments presented here regarding 
the costs of the UK exiting the EU are as-
sociated with significant uncertainties. No 
one knows what the international economic 
relationships between the UK and the rest 
would look like should the UK leave the 
EU. However, it is certain that the UK’s in-
tegration in the global economy would de-
cline and that this de-integration would 
shrink British economic growth. 
 
Although these deadweight welfare losses 
are countered by savings in the form of 
canceled contributions to the EU budget, 
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according to the calculations presented 
here even the most favorable scenario from 
the British perspective (soft exit with ex-
clusively static effects) yields expected 
GDP losses of around 0.6 percent, which is 
higher than the savings from the net pay-
ments to the EU budget of around 0.5 per-
cent of the GDP. Even in this case, a Brexit 
clearly poses an economic loss for the UK. 
With more severe economic isolation and 
taking into account the dynamic effects 
(shrinking productivity growth resulting 
from lower competitive pressure, departure 
of EU migrants, declining investment due 
to less freedom of movement for capital 
transactions), the GDP losses are signifi-
cantly higher. In the worst case scenario, 
the UK’s real GDP per capita in 2030 could 
be 14 percent lower than if it remained in 
the EU. Even if such extreme isolation is 
politically rather unlikely from our per-
spective, this theoretically conceivable 
value shows how heavily the UK’s eco-
nomic growth would depend on trade 
policy goodwill after a Brexit. The lost 
growth effects from future EU free-trade 
agreements are not even taken into consid-
eration here. 
 
The economic weakening of the British 
economy would also have consequences 
for the remaining EU countries. Even if 
real income losses there fall below the UK 
values, costs would arise from a lower 
GDP growth and the need to compensate 
for lost British contributions to the EU 
budget. 
 
Beyond the purely economic considera-
tions, the political disadvantages must be 
taken into account. A Brexit would be a 
significant setback for European integra-
tion and would inevitably weaken the EU. 
 
Therefore, we are firmly convinced that the 
combination of economic and political dis-
advantages of the UK exiting the EU would 
be detrimental for everyone involved and 
must be avoided. 
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Policy Brief 2015/03: Wage inequality in Germany – 
What role does global trade play? 
Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the 
mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a 
frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study 
revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 
percent of the increase in wage inequality in Germany. Primarily, 
the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany plays 
a greater role. The decline in collective bargaining is the primary 
company-specific driver of wage inequality. Nevertheless, protec-
tionist measures would not be effective for achieving greater 
wage equality. 
Policy Brief 2015/04: Labour Mobility in Europe – 
An untapped resource? 
Despite the public perception in many member states, intra-EU 
migration remains low. The limits to the potential of labour mo-
bility became evident during the economic crisis as high unem-
ployment rates in the periphery have only caused limited mobility 
from crisis countries. Hence, the bulk of labour mobility still flows 
from east to west. The Commission and member states should 
improve existing tools for cross-border job matching and adopt a 
longer-term view on labour mobility. 
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